GarudKumaraswamy1993changing


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@article{GarudKumaraswamy1993changing,
 title={{Changing competitive dynamics in network industries: An exploration of Sun Microsystems' open systems strategy}},
 author={Garud, R. and Kumaraswamy, A.},
 journal={Strategic Management Journal},
 volume={14},
 number={5},
 pages={351--369},
 issn={1097-0266},
 year={1993}
}

format for references

AIS

Garud, R., Jain, S., and Kumaraswamy, A. 2002. “Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and Java,” Academy of Management Journal (45:1), pp.196-214.

abstract



memo

abstract

Sun Microsystes provides rivals easy access to its technical knowledge and encourages them to enter its workstation market. This paper employs theoretical insights on technological systems and network externalities to understand Sun's open systems strategy. The paper also explores the changing nature of competition in network industries-industries characterized by network externalities and built around technological systems.


P351 Left

\cite{Porter1998competitive} suggests that firms erect entry an mobility barriers to limit competition among themselves. \cite{Reed1990causal} explore how firms can generate causal ambiguity to prevent rivals from duplicating distinctive competencies. \cite{Teece1986profiting} highlights the imprtance of appropriability regimes that provide firms with an opportunity to earn abovenormal profits through the introduction of new technologies.


@book{Porter1998competitive,
 title={{Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors: with a new introduction}},
 author={Porter, M.E.},
 isbn={0684841487},
 year={1998},
 publisher={Free Press}
}

@article{Reed1990causal,
 title={{Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competitive advantage}},
 author={Reed, R. and DeFillippi, R.J.},
 journal={Academy of management Review},
 volume={15},
 number={1},
 pages={88--102},
 issn={0363-7425},
 year={1990}
}

@article{Teece1986profiting,
 title={{Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy}},
 author={Teece, D.J.},
 journal={Research policy},
 volume={15},
 number={6},
 pages={285--305},
 issn={0048-7333},
 year={1986}
}

Why, then, would a firm provide rivals easy access to its technical knowledge and encourage entry into its market? What are the sources of competitive advantage for a firm that provides rivals easy access to its technical knowledge?

P352

left
All these industries consists of interrelated markets, each producing components of a larger technological system . These industries are also characterized by network externalities \cite{KatzShapiro1985network, FarrellSaloner1986installed, BesenSaloner1989economics, CrandallFlamm1989changing}

@article{KatzShapiro1985network,
 title={{Network externalities, competition, and compatibility}},
 author={Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C.},
 journal={The American economic review},
 volume={75},
 number={3},
 pages={424--440},
 issn={0002-8282},
 year={1985}
}

 title={{Installed base and compatibility: Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation}},
 author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.},
 journal={The American Economic Review},
 volume={76},
 number={5},
 pages={940--955},
 issn={0002-8282},
 year={1986}
}

@incollection{BesenSaloner1989economics,
 title={{The economics of telecommunications standards}},
 author={Besen, S.M. and Saloner, G.},
 booktitle={Changing the rules: Technological change, international competition, and regulation in communications},
 editor={Crandall, R.W. and Flamm, K.},
 isbn={0815715951},
 year={1989},
 publisher={Brookings Institution Press}
 year={1989}
}

@book{CrandallFlamm1989changing,
 title={{Changing the rules: technological change, international competition, and regulation in communications}},
 editor={Crandall, R.W. and Flamm, K.},
 isbn={0815715951},
 year={1989},
 publisher={Brookings Institution Press}
}

Right

Standard-based technologies and network interconnections break several `isolating mechanisms' \cite{Rumelt1984towards} that:
(1) prevent rivals from gaining acess to technical knowledge embodied in components and their interface standards, and
(2) keep users locked into networks because of high switching and transient imcompativility costs \cite{FarrellSaloner1986installed}.

@article{Rumelt1984towards,
 title={{Towards a strategic theory of the firm}},
 author={Rumelt, R.P.},
 journal={Resources, firms, and strategies: A reader in the resource-based perspective},
 pages={131--145},
 year={1984}
}

@article{FarrellSaloner1986installed,
 title={{Installed base and compatibility: Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation}},
 author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.},
 journal={The American Economic Review},
 volume={76},
 number={5},
 pages={940--955},
 issn={0002-8282},
 year={1986},
 publisher={JSTOR}
}

With the dissolution of isolating mechanisms, firms that wish to survive must introduce new products continually. Therefore, the workstation market is characterized by rapid technical change. In this rapidly changing environment, Sun exploits transient monopoly positions \cite{MacmillanEtAl1985competitors} that are created through its role as atechnology sponsor. A sponsor is a firm willing to invest in the development of a technology while sharing breakthroughs with others to promote its technology as the industry standard.

@article{MacmillanEtAl1985competitors,
 title={{Competitors' responses to easily imitated new products—exploring commercial banking product introductions}},
 author={MacMillan, I. and McCaffery, M.L. and Van Wijk, G.},
 journal={Strategic Management Journal},
 volume={6},
 number={1},
 pages={75--86},
 issn={1097-0266},
 year={1985}
}

In this paper, we introduce the notion of economies of substitution to explain how Sun has been able to offer new products by economizing on the resource consumptive R\&D process.

P353
Technological systems consist of a set of components that together provide utility to users. System performance is dependent not only upon constituent components, but also on the extent to which they are compatible with each other (\cite{Gabel1987open; 93,  HendersonClark1990architectural, TushmanRosenkopf1986organizational}.

@inarticle{Gabel1987open,
 title={{Open standards in the European computer industry: The case of X/OPEN}},
 author={Gabel, H.L.},
 booktitle={Product standardization and competitive strategy},
 editor={Gabel, H.L.},
 pages={91--123},
 publisher={Elsevier Science}
 year={1987}
}

@article{HendersonClark1990architectural,
 title={{Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms}},
 author={Henderson, R.M. and Clark, K.B.},
 journal={Administrative science quarterly},
 volume={35},
 number={1},
 year={1990},
 pages={9--30},
 publisher={Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School}
}

@article{TushmanRosenkopf1986organizational,
 title={{Organizational Determinants of Technological Change: Towards a Sociology of Technological Evolution}},
 author={Tushman, M.L. and Rosenkopf, L.},
 journal={Research in organizational behavior},
 editor={Staw, B. and Cummings, L.}
 volume={14},
 year={1986}
}

One way to ensure copatibility is
to custom-design individual system components to facilitate their interactions.
Another way to ensure compativility is
to design components that confirm to a common set of standards.

By standards, we mean codified specifications about components and their relatonal attributes \footnote{}.

\footnote{
\cite{David1987SomeNewStandards} provies a comprehensive taxonomy of standards that include conformance to
\item an ordinal scate
\item a cardinal scale
\item a dichotomous set.
}

@incollection{David1987SomeNewStandards,
 title={{Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the information age}},
 author={David, P.},
 booktitle={Economic policy and technological performance},
 editor={P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman},
 pages={206--239.},
 isbn={0521022215},
 year={1987},
 publisher={Cambridge Univ Press}
}

P354 Right
Proprietery control over technical knowledge provides dominant firms the porwer to set the rules by which rivals must play \cite{AdamsBlock1982Integrated}.

@article{AdamsBlock1982Integrated,
 title={{Integrated Monopoly and Market Power: System Selling, Compatibility Standards, and Market Control}},
 author={Adams, W. and Block, J. W.},
 journal={The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business},
 volume={22},
 number={4},
 pages={29--42},
 year={1982}
}

Proprietary control over technical knowledge also protects dominant firms from newentrants because system-users incur transient imcompatibility costs \cite{FarrellSaloner1986installed},

P356 left

Indeed, they may be determined by the possession (and exercise) of naked power to set the rules by which any and all comers shall be allowed to play the game \cite{AdamsBlock1982Integrated}.

Table.2
specialized component manufactures:
コメント:機能拡張の歴史。social graphなど、どんどん上のレイヤに上がっていく。

縦軸competitive marketにconsortium standards が加わるとどう展開するか。

P356 Right

There are two options for entrants and rivals to operate in a Quadrant 2 (Monopoly market/ Integrated system manufactures) \cite{Flamm1988creating}.

\item to offer products for niche markets that do not attrace the attention of the dominant system manufacturer
\item to operate in compatible component markets desigated by the dominant system-manufacturer.

@book{Flamm1988creating,
 title={{Creating the computer: government, industry, and high technology}},
 author={Flamm, K.},
 isbn={0815728506},
 year={1988},
 publisher={Brookings Institution Press}
}

P357 left
integrated system-manufacuturing provides a source of competitive advantage through the manipulation of undisclosed interface specifications. Integrated system-manufacturers also have the opportunity to bundle their products and engage in tie-in sales thereby reaping above normanl profits (e.g \cite{Burstein1960economics} \cite{DansbyConrad1984commodity} \cite{MatutesRegibeau1988mix}). Therefore, integrated system-manufacturing might appear to be an appealing source of competitive advantage.

@article{Burstein1960economics,
 title={{The economics of tie-in sales}},
 author={Burstein, M.L.},
 journal={The Review of Economics and Statistics},
 volume={42},
 number={1},
 pages={68--73},
 issn={0034-6535},
 year={1960}
}

@article{DansbyConrad1984commodity,
 title={{Commodity bundling}},
 author={Dansby, R.E. and Conrad, C.},
 journal={The American Economic Review},
 volume={74},
 number={2},
 pages={377--381},
 issn={0002-8282},
 year={1984}
}

@article{MatutesRegibeau1988mix,
 title={{" Mix and match": product compatibility without network externalities}},
 author={Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P.},
 journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
 volume={19},
 number={2},
 pages={221--234},
 issn={0741-6261},
 year={1988}
}

rather than remain an integrated system-manuracturer, a firm in a network industry might choose to increase system viability by licensing its technology to other firms in complementary markets and to rivals \cite{Conner1995obtaining}.

@article{Conner1995obtaining,
 title={{Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated: When Can Encouraging" Clones" Pay?}},
 author={Conner, K.R.},
 journal={Management Science},
 volume={41},
 number={2},
 pages={209--225},
 issn={0025-1909},
 year={1995}
}

@article{Conner1995obtaining,
 title={{Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated: When Can Encouraging" Clones" Pay?}},
 author={Conner, K.R.},
 journal={Management Science},
 volume={41},
 number={2},
 pages={209--225},
 issn={0025-1909},
 year={1995}
}


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