Funk2003standards


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@article{Funk2003standards,
 title={{Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages}},
 author={Funk, J.L.},
 journal={Research Policy},
 volume={32},
 number={8},
 pages={1325--1341},
 year={2003},
 publisher={Elsevier}
}

format for references

経営情報学会

Funk, J.L. "Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages", Research Policy, Vol.32, No.8, 2003, pp. 1325-1341

CIRIEC Japan

Funk, J.L. [2003] 「Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages」, 『Research Policy』, 32巻8号, pp. 1325-1341

LNBIP

Funk, J.L.: Standards, dominant designs and preferential acquisition of complementary assets through slight information advantages. In: Research Policy. vol.32, no.8, pp. 1325-1341. (2003)

memo

Abstract

the leading Japanese cellular service provider (NTT DoCoMo) offered preferencial information about the "open" Japanese digital phone standard in return for preferentioal access to the lightest phones from four phone suppliers. These four phone suppliers used the preferential access to this information to obtain preferential cooperation from parts suppliers and to make better design tradeoffs between parts than the other phone suppliers. These superior design tradeoffs enabled the DoCoMo suppliers to crate various dominant designs within the Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) standard. The creation of these dominant designs forced other phone and part manufactureres to change their desing strategies and copy the designs used by the DoCoMo phone and part suppliers.


pp.1325-6
the suppliers may take the lione's share of the profits if the complementary asset is a bottleneck \cite{Teece1986profiting}.

Teece1986profiting
@article{Teece1986profiting,
 title={{Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy}},
 author={Teece, D.J.},
 journal={Research policy},
 volume={15},
 number={6},
 pages={285--305},
 issn={0048-7333},
 year={1986},
 publisher={Elsevier}
}

pp.1326
This paper discusses how firms can use slight information advantages to obtain preferential access to complementary assets and create multi-level dominant designs.

Following the emergence of dominant design, problem solving moves into more detailed levels in the design hierarchy \cite{Clark1985interaction, NelsonWinter1982evolutionary}.

Clark1985interaction
@article{Clark1985interaction,
 title={{The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological evolution}},
 author={Clark, K.B.},
 journal={Research Policy},
 volume={14},
 number={5},
 pages={235--251},
 issn={0048-7333},
 year={1985},
 publisher={Elsevier}
}

NelsonWinter1982evolutionary
@book{NelsonWinter1982evolutionary,
 title={{An evolutionary theory of economic change}},
 author={Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G.},
 isbn={0674272285},
 year={1982},
 publisher={Belknap Press of Harvard University Press}
}

Both the innovator and the holders of the complementary assets can reap the benefits from creating multi-level dominant designs. The innovator can receive preferencial access to the complementary assets in return for preferentioal information and guarantees of heavy investments.

pp.1327
In the industrial standard's literature, firm behavior and network externalities have a strong effect on which design becomes an industrial standard through the so-called bandwagon effect. Since the number of users has a direct effect on the value of the product, market share becomes a measure of quality and a rising market share increases the product's charm. Thus, the acquisition of an early installed base and the opening the standard in order to acquire an early installed base are accepted strategies for making your product or technology an industrial standard \cite{Rofles1974theory, OrenSmith1981critical, FarrellSaloner1985standardization, KatzShapiro1985network, Asaba1995cooperation, ShapiroVarian1999information}.

Rofles1974theory
J. Rofles, A theory of interdependent demand for a communications service. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science vol. 5 no, 1 (1974), pp. 16–37.

OrenSmith1981critical
@article{OrenSmith1981critical,
 title={{Critical mass and tariff structure in electronic communications markets}},
 author={Oren, S.S. and Smith, S.A.},
 journal={The Bell Journal of Economics},
 volume={12},
 number={2},
 pages={467--487},
 issn={0361-915X},
 year={1981},
 publisher={JSTOR}
}

FarrellSaloner1985standardization
@article{FarrellSaloner1985standardization,
 title={{Standardization, compatibility, and innovation}},
 author={Farrell, J. and Saloner, G.},
 journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
 volume={16},
 number={1},
 pages={70--83},
 issn={0741-6261},
 year={1985},
 publisher={JSTOR}
}

KatzShapiro1985network
@article{KatzShapiro1985network,
 title={{Network externalities, competition, and compatibility}},
 author={Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C.},
 journal={The American economic review},
 volume={75},
 number={3},
 pages={424--440},
 issn={0002-8282},
 year={1985},
 publisher={JSTOR}
}

Asaba1995cooperation
@BOOK{Asaba1995cooperation,
title={競争と協力の戦略 - 業界標準をめぐる企業行動},
author={淺羽 茂},
publisher={有斐閣},
year={1995},
month={3},
isbn={9784641067257},
url={http://amazon.co.jp/o/ASIN/4641067252/},
price={¥ 4,095},
totalpages={213},
timestamp={2011.04.07},
}

ドミナントデザインでは、ネットワーク外部性よりも技術的優劣が影響力を持つ。標準はネットワーク外部性が大きく影響する、、、というよりも、それが全て。

The dominat design literature is much less clear on how domina t designs emerge and how firms can make their products or technology a dominat design. The literature generally argues that technical factors play a more important role than network externalities and openness. This suggests that firms compete solely in terms of technology and the competition between alternative product forms is determined by technical factors and economies of scale \cite{AbernathyUtterback1978patterns, AndersonTushman1990technological, HendersonClark1990architectural, Utterback1996mastering}.


AndersonTushman1990technological
@article{AndersonTushman1990technological,
 title={{Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.}},
 author={Anderson, P. and Tushman, M.L.},
 journal={Administrative science quarterly},
 volume={35},
 number={4},
 year={1990},
 publisher={Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School}
}

pp.1328
When firms open their technology in order to have it adopted as a standard they retain early mover advantages. By creating a dominant design at a detailed level in the design hierarchy, the innovator and the holders of the complementary assets are able to further delay the imitator's access to the preferential complementary assets. And in the current era of rapid technological change, a few yearscan often be enough time to establish a sufficient financial and brand image advantage and use this advantage to prepare for the next thchnological discontinuity.

\section{11. Discussion}
pp.1339
firms can influenc the emergence of dominant designs.

NTT DoCoMo and its suppliers heavily influenced the resulting dominant design through their information advantages. DoCoMo's phone suppliers used their greater knowledge of the PDC standard to make better design tradeoffs.

NTT DoCoMo did have the largest shre in the market when it was implementing its starategy and wothout this large share, it would probably have been hard to implement the strategy.

this paper has identified some of the conditions that are necessary to use the "multi-level dominant design" strategy.

pp.1340

Often times the most important aspects of a standard are not included in the documents but instead are written "between the lines".
これ、webでやったら、developerが対応できないから、無理。web標準は万人が活用できる仕様書となる。

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